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EVOLVING SCIENCE MEETS THE STAGNATING APPEALS
PROCESS: INTEGRATING DAUBERT INTO THE POST-TRIAL
PHASE
Jacey Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
Dr. James Grigson, also known as “Doctor Death,” testified at the
sentencing phases of over 100 convicted murderers in Texas.1 He did
so until 1995, when he was expelled from the American Psychiatric
Association.2 His testimony at most of these dispositions was that the
defendant, unless put to death, would kill again.3 This type of
testimony, often provided by forensic psychologists such as Dr.
Grigson, is styled in death penalty cases as “future dangerousness,”
evidence which tends to predict a defendant’s risk of violence upon
reentry into society.4
One such trial in which Dr. Death testified was the trial of Mr.
Randall Dale Adams, a twenty-eight-year-old man wrongly convicted
of shooting a police officer in Dallas, Texas, in 1977.5 In that case,
sixteen-year-old David Harris picked Adams up in a stolen vehicle on
November 27, 1976.6 The two spent the day together doing
recreational drugs and drinking alcohol, and later, Harris dropped
Adams off at a motel.7 Thereafter, Harris was pulled over by Officer

*

1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

Law Clerk at the Baltimore County State’s Attorney’s Office. J.D. Candidate, May
2018, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., Classical Studies, 2015, The
College of William and Mary. The author would like to specially thank Professor
John Bessler for his valuable feedback and guidance, Kelly Goebel and Megan
Micco for being fearless leaders, as well as the ones who got her here, her family.
Texas ‘Dr. Death’ Retires After 167 Capital Case Trials, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 20,
2003), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/dec/20/20031220-113219-5189
r/.
Id.
See id. (“In more than 100 of the 167 capital cases in which he was involved, he
testified strongly that a defendant would kill again if given the opportunity . . . .”).
See Mark Douglas Cunningham & Jon R. Sorensen, Capital Offenders in Texas
Prisons: Rates, Correlates, and an Actuarial Analysis of Violent Misconduct, 31
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 553, 553–55 (2007).
Alexandra Gross, Randall Dale Adams, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://ww
w.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=2984 (last
updated Sept. 23, 2014).
Id.
Id.
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Robert Wood because he had been driving with no headlights.8
Harris shot Officer Wood at least four times and sped away.9 He
later pinned the murder on Adams, his companion earlier in the day.10
At Adams’s sentencing, before the jury, Dr. Grigson testified as an
expert witness, stating: “I would place Mr. Adams at the very
extreme, worse or severe end of the scale. You can’t get beyond that.
There is nothing known in the world today that is going to change
this man; we don’t have anything.”11
It appears this testimony, among other factors, caused the jury to
sentence Adams to death.12 After being confined on death row for
twelve years, Adams was exonerated in 1989, when local attorneys
took an interest in his case.13 During a three-day hearing on his
motion for a new trial, Adams’s attorneys argued that the State had
committed prosecutorial misconduct, withheld exculpatory evidence,
knowingly allowed its witnesses to perjure themselves, and convicted
Adams with insufficient evidence.14 Additionally, Harris later
recanted his statement against Adams.15 After the hearing, the court
granted Adams’s motion, and the State thereafter dismissed all
charges.16 Fortunately, due to other errors in Adams’s trial, he was
exonerated.17
Adams walked out of prison; he was free.18 Yet in his case, a
doctor took the stand in front of a jury and confidently testified with
100% certainty that Adams would kill again.19 This so-called
“scientific evidence” admitted at Adams’s trial, while perhaps
considered acceptable in 1977, certainly would be considered suspect
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Future Dangerousness Predictions Wrong
95% of the Time: New Study on Capital Trials Exposes Widespread Unreliable
Testimony, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1099 [hereinafter Future
Dangerousness Predictions Wrong].
Gross, supra note 5.
See id. Adams was exonerated in part because of publicity his case received from a
notable documentary, The Thin Blue Line. See Douglas Martin, Randall Adams, 61,
Dies; Freed with Help of Film, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.co
m/2011/06/26/us/26adams.html.
See Gross, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
See infra note 168 and accompanying text. Mr. Adams was eventually released on
grounds unrelated to the testimony of Dr. Grigson. See infra note 168 and
accompanying text. I argue that he should have been granted a different kind of
remedy based upon Dr. Grigson’s questionable testimony. See infra Part IV.
See Gross, supra note 5.
See id.
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today,20 especially in light of Dr. Grigson’s expulsion from the
American Psychiatric Association for his inaccurate predictions of
“future dangerousness” predicated solely on hypotheticals.21
This Comment proposes a procedural mechanism stemming from
the executive branch, rather than the judiciary, as a solution to the
quandary in which Adams found himself:22 sitting in prison for a
conviction with a sentence that is materially supported by suspect
scientific evidence.23 This mechanism would introduce the Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.24 (Daubert) standard of
admission of scientific evidence into a convicted defendant’s posttrial proceedings.25 Using this mechanism, a defendant would have a
chance to challenge the validity of suspect scientific evidence, that if
scrutinized by the modern scientific community, would not meet the
Daubert standard.26 This Comment will focus on the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and defendants being held in federal custody
only, as an example of a workable mechanism which states could
choose to adapt to fit their own post-trial procedure.27

20.

21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

The future dangerousness test today is a highly controversial topic, with an
increasing number of studies and reports showing its potential weaknesses. See, e.g.,
Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 4; James W. Marquart et al., Gazing into the
Crystal Ball: Can Jurors Accurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 449, 458 (1989); Elizabeth S. Vartkessian, What One Hand
Giveth, the Other Taketh Away: How Future Dangerousness Corrupts Guilt Verdicts
and Produces Premature Punishment Decisions in Capital Cases, 32 PACE L. REV.
447, 451 (2012); 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 11:11, Westlaw (database updated Dec.
2016) (“Practically no research exists on the interrater reliability of descriptions of
personality and psychopathology made by psychologists using projective
techniques.”); Future Dangerousness Predictions Wrong, supra note 11 (“The
American Psychiatric Association has stated since 1983 that ‘[t]he unreliability of
psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by now an established
fact within the profession.’”). Only four states consider the assessment of future
dangerousness in capital sentencing mandatory, and in twelve states, future
dangerousness is permissive. Mark D. Cunningham et al., Capital Jury DecisionMaking: The Limitations of Predictions of Future Violence, 15 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL’Y, & L. 223, 225 (2009).
Kristine Phillips, In Texas, a Man Who Didn’t Kill Anybody Is About to Be Executed
for Murder, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/p
ost-nation/wp/2016/08/12/in-texas-a-man-who-didnt-kill-anybody-is-about-to-be-ex
ecuted-for-murder/?utm_term=.0cdebfe812d4.
See infra Section IV.A.
See Gross, supra note 5.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See infra Section IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section II.B.
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First, this Comment will examine the current state of the law,
delving into the pretrial standards of admissibility of scientific
evidence, then highlighting federal post-trial procedure generally.28
Next, this Comment will propose a mechanism through the executive
branch to challenge the validity of scientific methodology material to
the defendant’s conviction that could be filed after all judicial
procedural remedies have been exhausted.29 The passage of time
would serve as a way for petitioners to revisit the science in their
convictions after new technology has evolved and old scholarship has
been discarded.30 This could protect a defendant in Adams’s shoes,
that is, a person in jail whose sentence or conviction, once supported
by Daubert approved science, now hinges on suspicious science.31
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Because this Comment will propose a hearing in the post-trial
phase that incorporates important characteristics of the pretrial
Daubert hearing, it is necessary to detail the essence of Daubert.32
By analyzing how scientific evidence is handled pretrial, a parallel of
how it could be done in the post-trial phase may be drawn.33
A. Pretrial Determination of the Validity of Scientific Evidence
The predominant common law test of admissibility of scientific
evidence was introduced in 1923 in the landmark case Frye v. United
States.34 The scientific methodology at issue in Frye was a “systolic
blood pressure deception test,” which was akin to an early form of a
lie detector test.35 However, the Frye Court noted that “when a
scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.”36 This
was a novel opinion because it distinguished a previously established
scientific methodology from cutting edge technology.37
This
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.A.
See 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Id. at 1014 (“[T]he theory seems to be that truth is spontaneous, and comes without
conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort,
which is reflected in the blood pressure.”).
Id.
Id. (“Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
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distinction is the common thread that runs from Frye to modern
scientific evidence jurisprudence.38
The brief 1923 opinion developed into what became known as the
“‘general acceptance’ test” of scientific methodology, which
permeated the common law both federally and in the states for
seventy years.39 A Frye hearing at its very essence determines
whether the proffered testimony is “generally accepted in the
particular field in which it belongs.”40
This test is indisputably vague.41 The actual case, concise and
without citation, does not provide for a specific procedural
mechanism.42 Rather, it established a broad framework of inquiry
that a court should follow before admitting scientific evidence.43
After Frye, most states followed a two-step inquiry.44 First, the
courts identified the relevant field under which the evidence would
fall.45
Second, the court determined whether the particular
methodology had been generally accepted within that relevant
scientific field.46
Because of the lack of specificity that the Frye case bequeathed to
the courts, states began to examine factors that could help them
determine the reliability of the disputed evidence.47 Factors the states
employed included the following: the methodology’s acceptance in
the scientific field,48 the qualifications of the expert,49 the technique’s
general use compared to its specific use in the case at issue, 50 the
potential error rate,51 the availability of literature and research

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”).
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
Id. at 585.
1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1:5, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2016).
Id.
Frye, 293 F. at 1013–14; FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 40, § 1:5.
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 40, § 1:5.
See id.
See id.
See id.
John W. Parry, Expert Evidence and Testimony: Daubert Versus Frye, 28 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 136, 136 n.10 (citing JACK
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE §§ 702–03, 708–19
(1987)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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relating to the technique,52 the novelty of the technique,53 and the
degree to which the technique’s interpretation relied upon the
expert’s subjective opinion.54
In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence codified a different
procedure for the admission of expert testimony.55 The original text
of Rule 702 read: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”56
Rule 702 allowed a more lenient entrance for scientific evidence
into the courtroom than Frye.57 What was missing from the Federal
Rule was the requirement that a methodology be “generally
accepted” within the scientific community.58 Members of the jury, as
the triers of fact, could determine the weight of the evidence
themselves, thereby diminishing the trial judge’s prior role as a
“gatekeeper” in determining the reliability of the evidence in the
relevant scientific community.59 Because the Federal Rule’s advisory
committee notes and legislative history were silent on Frye, the
debate over whether Rule 702 overruled Frye brewed in the legal
community until the seminal Supreme Court case of Daubert.60
Daubert finally determined that Rule 702 had superseded Frye’s
general acceptance test for admissibility of scientific evidence. 61 The
Daubert Court came to this conclusion, holding that “a rigid ‘general
acceptance’ requirement would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of
the Federal Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to “opinion” testimony.’”62
A similarity between the old Frye standard and Daubert’s
definition of Rule 702 is that both allow the judge to serve a
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.
60.

61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (amended 2000).
Id.
29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
6267, at 306 (2016).
Richard B. Racine et al., The Battle over Science in the Courtroom: Can a Balance
Be Found When Applying the Gatekeeping Principles of the Supreme Court’s
Daubert Decision?, 42 FED. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 36, 38.
Id.
Craig Lee Montz, Trial Judges as Scientific Gatekeepers After Daubert, Joiner,
Kumho Tire, and Amended Rule 702: Is Anyone Still Buying This?, 33 UWLA L.
REV. 87, 93 (2001).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
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“gatekeeping role” in the admission of scientific evidence.63 Daubert
requires a judge to determine that the scientific evidence sought to be
introduced is relevant and reliable.64 Daubert provides suggestions
for how courts should evaluate scientific evidence to determine its
reliability as an alternative to the strict “general acceptance” test.65
The recommended list includes:
(1) [W]hether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has
been tested––that is, whether the expert’s theory can be
challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead
simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot
reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the
technique or theory has been subject to peer review and
publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the
technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the
technique or theory has been generally accepted in the
scientific community.66
After Daubert, the existing Federal Rule was reworked to match
the case’s holding.67 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 now reads:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.68

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

68.

Id. at 596.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 593–94; FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
Id. This amendment is also based in part on the holding of Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael, in which the Supreme Court held that the “basic gatekeeping
obligation” applied to “all expert testimony,” rather than just scientific testimony.
526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
FED. R. EVID. 702.
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Furthermore, the Daubert Court held that Rule 702 does not
preclude the testimony of two experts who may have drawn two
different conclusions using the same methodology, stating that “[t]he
focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not
on the conclusions that they generate.”69 The Court also held that the
burden of proof in a Daubert hearing is incumbent upon the
proponent of the witness to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, first, that the expert is qualified to testify as such, and
second, that the witness’s opinions are both relevant and reliable.70
Having surveyed the procedure of pretrial determinations of the
admission and exclusion of scientific evidence, an examination of
post-trial procedure is necessary to determine where and how a
Daubert-style hearing would play out in the post-trial phase.71
B. Post-Trial Procedure
Federally, a criminal defendant has an array of appeals and
collateral attacks that he may use to argue the validity of his
conviction or sentence.72 Generally, a convicted defendant’s first
attack must be done on direct appeal.73 The federal circuit courts
must hear appeals from all final decisions of the federal district
courts.74
Generally, the next step for a defendant is to appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States.75 28 U.S.C. § 2106 provides:

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

75.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95.
Id. at 592–93, 592 n.10; DANA G. DEATON: THE DAUBERT CHALLENGE TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 3, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017).
See infra Section II.B; see also infra Part IV (proposing a procedural mechanism for
post-trial criminal procedure).
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32–38 (providing post-conviction
procedures).
NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 29:13 (2d ed.), Westlaw
(database updated June 2017).
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). This provision states:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States,
the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone,
the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described
in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.
Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012).
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The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate
jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse
any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought
before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct
the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or
require such further proceedings to be had as may be just
under the circumstances.76
Review on a writ of certiorari is subject to judicial discretion and
not an automatic right, and thus will only be granted for “compelling
reasons.”77
After a convicted defendant has exhausted his direct appellate
remedies, the next step is to attack his conviction collaterally.78
There are strong interests in both preserving the finality of judgments
and in maintaining orderly trial procedure.79 These interests “must be
overcome before collateral relief can be justified.”80
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Section 2255) is the overarching statute by
which a petitioner may move the court on collateral grounds to
reconsider his conviction.81 The remedies available to a petitioner, if
successful under a Section 2255 claim, include release, a new trial, or
the court may vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.82
A petitioner seeking a remedy pursuant to Section 2255 has three
broad grounds by which he may collaterally attack his conviction.83
The prisoner “must allege as a basis for relief: (1) an error of
constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory
limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so fundamental as to
render the entire proceeding invalid.”84 If the claim is not one of
constitutional significance, the petitioner must show that there are

76.
77.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
SUP. CT. R. 10.
COHEN, supra note 73, § 29:13. A collateral attack is “a tactic whereby a party seeks
to circumvent an earlier ruling of one court by filing a subsequent action in another
court.” 21A TRACY BATEMAN ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYER’S EDITION §
51:221, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017).
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 n.13 (1977).
Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).
Id. § 2255(a)–(b).
Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id. (citation omitted). For an explanation of why part (3) of this framework is
inapplicable to the proposal in this Comment, see Part III.

304

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47

“‘exceptional circumstances’ that make the need for redress
evident.”85
If seeking relief under Section 2255, allegations of error regarding
trial court procedure, such as sufficiency of the evidence to support
conviction, grand jury issues, or other general trial procedure
mistakes which constitute errors of constitutional dimension, will not
be reviewed by the collateral court.86 Commonly attempted, but
generally unsuccessful, claims made pursuant to Section 2255
include attacking the petitioner’s charging document or the admission
of certain evidence at trial.87 Types of successful claims cognizable
under Section 2255 include attacks on effectiveness of counsel
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment,88 the validity of a guilty plea,89
and constitutionally deficient jury instructions.90
In addition to the claims of constitutional dimension that can be
brought pursuant to Section 2255, if a petitioner can prove that he is
actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, he will be
exempted from the general procedural bar against claims that should
have been raised on direct appeal.91 The Supreme Court has held that
85.
86.
87.

88.

89.

90.

91.

Tavares v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 2d 126, 131 (D. Mass. 2001) (quoting David
v. United States, 134 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998)).
Jackson v. United States, 495 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1974).
See, e.g., Crimson v. United States, 510 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (“[E]rror in
the admission of testimony at trial is an improper ground upon which to base a claim
for post-conviction relief in a proceeding under s[ection] 2255.”); Kelly v. United
States, 350 F.2d 398, 399 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that a petitioner’s attacks on
admissibility of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence to establish the
petitioner’s mens rea were suited for direct appeal and not reviewable pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255).
See, e.g., United States v. Tarbell, 728 F.3d 122, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2013) (“When
faced with a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, . . . [the
Court of Appeals] may: (1) decline to hear the claim, permitting the appellant to
raise the issue as part of a subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255; (2) remand the claim to the district court for necessary factfinding;
or (3) decide the claim on the record before . . . [it].” (citation omitted)).
See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 961 F.2d 1339, 1341 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Collateral
relief is available to Oliver under section 2255 only if any legal error in taking
Oliver’s guilty plea is ‘jurisdictional, constitutional, or is a fundamental defect which
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” (citation omitted)).
See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 98 F.3d 1052, 1054–55 (8th Cir. 1996) (“An
instructional error must be of ‘constitutional dimensions’ to warrant post-conviction
relief . . . . That requires a showing that ‘the ailing instruction by itself so infected
the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process, not merely [that] the
instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned.’” (citation
omitted)); Merrill v. United States, 599 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1979) (“Generally, an
improper jury instruction is not cognizable in a s[ection] 2255 proceeding unless it is
‘of constitutional magnitude or “inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice.”’” (citation omitted)).
United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 2014).
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“[t]o establish actual innocence, [a] petitioner must demonstrate that,
‘in light of all the evidence,’ ‘it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him.’”92
The final remedy available to a federal prisoner is executive
clemency.93 The Supreme Court has held that “[c]lemency, while not
required by the Due Process Clause, was a significant, traditionally
available remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice when judicial
process was exhausted.”94 Historically, pardon and commutation
decisions have been outside the scope of judicial review.95 The goal
of this executive remedy “is to grant clemency as a matter of grace,
thus allowing the executive to consider a wide range of factors not
comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing
determinations.”96
Throughout the post-trial phase, a petitioner must always be wary
of the doctrine of waiver.97 Certain types of claims not raised on
direct appeal are considered waived and may not be reviewed by the
court later pursuant to a Section 2255 motion.98 Generally, errors of
constitutional dimension cannot be waived, but non-fundamental
errors are subject to waiver.99 This doctrine is important, as the
purpose of it is to balance two opposing, but compelling, judicial
92.
93.

94.
95.
96.
97.

98.

99.

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (citing Schulp v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 327–28 (1995)).
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . . shall have the power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.”).
Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272, 278 (1998).
Id. at 276 (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981)).
Id. at 280–81.
See generally George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More
Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977) (analyzing waiver in criminal
procedure).
See Jerald J. Director, Annotation, Consideration of, or Failure to Raise or
Consider, Question on Appeal from Conviction or on Postconviction Remedy, as
Precluding Its Consideration on Subsequent Motion to Vacate Sentence Under 28
U.S.C.A. § 2255, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 724 (1972); see also, e.g., Knight v. United States,
37 F.3d 769, 774 (1st Cir. 1994) (“Normally, failure to raise a constitutional issue on
direct appeal will bar raising the issue on collateral attack unless the defendant can
show cause for the failure and actual prejudice.”); Ingram v. United States, 299 F.2d
351, 352 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that a collateral proceeding is not a direct
substitute for an appeal); Sanders v. United States, 230 F.2d 127, 127 (4th Cir. 1956)
(holding that because the Petitioner failed to raise his current claims on direct appeal,
he was unable to use them to collaterally attack his sentence).
See Hunter v. United States, 160 F.3d 1109, 1115 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Relief is not
available in a section 2255 proceeding for a claim of nonconstitutional, sentencingguideline error when that error was procedurally defaulted through the failure to
bring a direct appeal.”).
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interests: maintaining the finality of criminal judgments, while
affording those rare criminal defendants who are innocent or
convicted on insufficient evidence the right to collaterally challenge
their convictions.100
III. THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
A. Timing
There does not seem to be a logical location to raise the proposed
challenge to scientific evidence. The two main ways to attack a
conviction, on direct appeal and collaterally, do not provide a
meaningful way for a petitioner, years later after these remedies have
already been exhausted, to have a court take another look at the
scientific evidence.101 In many cases, direct appeal could be too soon
after the conviction for the relevant scientific community to change
the way it sees the underlying scientific evidence.102 A challenge
made pursuant to Section 2255 also has a short time-period, with only
a year-long statute of limitations.103 It seems likely that new
scientific evidence in certain fields would take longer than one year
to emerge from the alleged date that the error occurred, as that would
be either the trial date or the pretrial Daubert hearing date. Because
there is not a natural place in the currently established post-trial
phase, this Comment proposes a new solution.104
B. Due Process: The Basis for the Proposed Procedural
Mechanism
Due Process, as established by the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution,105 and as applied to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment,106 gives this “problem” constitutional dimension:
Americans are afforded the right to due process of law. 107 The
importance and meaning of due process of law is summarized well by
Justice Stewart in Hawkins v. United States: “Any rule that impedes
100.
101.
102.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Dix, supra note 97, at 195.
See infra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2012) (providing the time limits for filing an appeal in the
federal courts); see also infra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that a § 2255
challenge is subject to a one-year statute of limitations).
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2012).
See infra Part IV.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
Id.

2018

Integrating Daubert into the Post-Trial Phase

307

the discovery of truth in a court of law impedes as well the doing of
justice.”108
The precise definition of due process of law is difficult to pin
down.109 For example, in Davidson v. New Orleans, Justice Miller
described the essence of due process in a workable manner:
But, apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give any
definition which would be at once perspicuous,
comprehensive, and satisfactory, there is wisdom, we think,
in the ascertaining of the intent and application of such an
important phrase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases
presented for decision shall require, with the reasoning on
which such decisions may be founded.110
Using Justice Miller’s definition, one can see that the given
definition of “due process of law” can change with the times.111
Furthermore, Hurtado v. California suggests that due process of law
“refers to that law of the land which derives its authority from the
legislative powers conferred upon congress by the constitution of the
United States.”112 The origin of this right may permit the current
government to define the bounds of due process “exercised within the
limits therein prescribed, and interpreted according to the principles
of the common law.”113
Due process of law, then, is the ever-evolving procedural fairness
and justice for every criminal defendant.114 With that workable
definition of due process of law in mind, it is easy to see how the
privilege to have a trial that is based upon valid scientific evidence
would be derived from basic due process of law principles.
IV. PROPOSAL: A PROCEDURAL MECHANISM TO FIX THE
PROBLEM
A. The Governmental Body
The governmental body presiding over the proposed procedural
mechanism would be derived from the executive branch, as opposed
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

358 U.S. 74, 81 (1958) (Stewart, J., concurring).
See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 533–34 (1884).
96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
See id.
110 U.S. at 535.
Id.
Id. at 535–36.
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to the judicial.115 This body would preside over a hearing, acting as a
last resort remedy available to a petitioner serving a sentence
imposed using junk science.116 Removing the body from the grasp of
the judiciary would serve two purposes: first, a diverse group of
people could bring a fresh perspective to an old case,117 and second, it
would create consistency with the other executive branch checks to
the judiciary.118
1.

The Board Make-up

The proposed make-up of the board would not be limited to
attorneys: it would include laypeople. Similar to a parole board,119
this board would be comprised of three members appointed for
several year terms by the President, with the advice and consent of
the Senate.120 No specific qualifications or disqualifications for
membership would be statutorily prescribed.121
For example, the 2017 make-up of the parole board includes one
attorney, one politician, and one former police officer.122 The
professional experiences that the members had prior to their
appointments create a diverse background of approaches to and
perspectives on the legal system that reinforce the Commission’s
mission “to promote public safety and strive for justice and fairness
in the exercise of its authority to release and revoke offenders under
its jurisdiction.”123
In this case, the members of the scientific evidence review board
would come from diverse backgrounds as the parole board
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

120.
121.
122.

123.

See infra Section IV.A.2.
See infra Section IV.A.1.
See infra Section IV.A.1.
See infra Section IV.A.2.
The federal parole system underwent a massive change in 1987, discontinuing the
current parole system. COHEN, supra note 73, § 5:2. The former system was
replaced by legislation which requires a prisoner to complete eighty-five percent of
his sentence before becoming eligible for release. Prison Time Surges for Federal
Inmates, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/re
search-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/11/prison-time-surges-for-federal-inmates.
The U.S. Parole Commission still exists to serve as the parole board for those prisoners convicted prior to November 1, 1987. Parole Commission, FED. REG., https://w
ww.federalregister.gov/agencies/parole-commission (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
COHEN, supra note 73, § 5:2.
Id.
Meet the Chairman, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/uspc/meet-chairman
(last updated Feb. 8, 2016); Meet the Commissioners, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/uspc/meet-commissioners (last updated Sept. 3, 2015).
Meet the Chairman, supra note 122; Meet the Commissioners, supra note 122; About
the Commission, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/uspc/about-commission0 (last updated Mar. 3, 2016).
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encourages.124 Moreover, the President could appoint members who
have backgrounds in science, similarly to how the President may
appoint cabinet members based on relevant professional
backgrounds.125
2.

The Executive Checks on the Judiciary

This proposed body would extend from the executive branch,
similar to the United States Parole Commission, as an important
check on the judicial system.126 In the federal parole system, the
Commission has the power to grant parole, despite the court’s
independent determination to put an offender away for a set period of
time.127
The United States Constitution does not contain an express
provision prohibiting “the officials of one branch of government from
exercising functions of the other branches.”128 In fact, Justice Warren
once observed:
This ‘separation of powers’ was obviously not instituted
with the idea that it would promote governmental efficiency.
It was, on the contrary, looked to as a bulwark against
tyranny. For if governmental power is fractionalized, if a
given policy can be implemented only by a combination of
legislative enactment, judicial application, and executive
implementation, no man or group of men will be able to
impose its unchecked will.129
For example, sentencing is not inherently or exclusively a judicial
function.130 Under this rationale, the parole board was designed to
serve as a permissible, additional check on the judicial power to
restrain an individual’s liberty.131 Just like sentencing is not

124.
125.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of Appointments
Clause of United States Constitution, Article II, Section 2, cl. 2, 59 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1
(2011). The presidential appointment power is derived from Article II, section 2,
clause 2 of the United States Constitution, coined the “Appointments Clause.” Id.
See id.
See 28 C.F.R. § 2.2(a)–(b) (2007).
Geraghty v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1210 (3d Cir. 1983).
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965).
Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41–42 (1916).
See Geraghty, 719 F.2d at 1211–12 (“As we emphasized earlier, Addonizio reiterated
this three-way sharing of responsibility in which Congress sets the statutory
maximum sentence, the courts impose sentences within those limits, and the

310

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47

inherently designated to one branch, the validity of a conviction also
should not be inherently designated to one branch.132
B. The Workable Standard
Finally, it is necessary to determine first, the circumstances under
which a petitioner may bring a claim before this board,133 and second,
the standard under which the board may evaluate the claim.134 First,
the petitioner must meet four elements in his petition before he may
be afforded the privilege of being heard by the proposed body, and if
he fails, the petition will be summarily dismissed.135 Next, the
petitioner has a full hearing before the proposed body. 136 Finally, the
petitioner’s remedy will be selected by the proposed body and
properly administered.137
1.

Petitioner’s Prima Facie Showing

In order to bring a claim pursuant to this proposed mechanism,
there are elements that a petitioner would have to show in order to be
afforded the right to a hearing before the board.138 The petitioner
would have to make a prima facie showing of four elements in order
to be granted a hearing before the board.139
First, the petitioner would have to exhaust all post-trial remedies
and collateral attacks.140 The waiver doctrine of post-trial procedure
is still relevant and would still apply in this stage of the petitioner’s
proceeding.141 It is important to recall the waiver’s justification,
which is to maintain the integrity of the finality of a court’s final
judgment.142 Therefore, waiver applies, and this challenge could only
be made after all other judicial remedies have been exhausted.143
Second, the petitioner would have to make a showing that science
has changed from the generally accepted standard under which he

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Commission establishes release dates within the eligibility range of the courts’
sentences.”).
See id.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
See infra Section IV.B.2.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
See infra Section IV.B.2.
See infra Section IV.B.3.
See infra notes 140–53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 154–56 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.B.
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was convicted to the contemporary approach.144 The petitioner
would first have to show the baseline: testimony from experts at the
time of his hearing recorded in the transcripts. If there was not a
Daubert-like hearing at trial, the petitioner would have to provide
scientific studies, contemporaneous to his conviction date, that reflect
the general opinion of the relevant scientific community at that time.
Then, the petitioner would discuss in his petition what testimony he
hopes to elicit at the hearing to show that science has, in fact, evolved
in some substantive way since the date of his conviction that could
materially call into question the legitimacy of his conviction or
sentencing.
The third and fourth elements would be modeled off of the
Strickland v. Washington effectiveness-of-counsel standard.145 To
satisfy the third element, the petitioner would be required to show
that the evidence at issue was material either to the validity of his
conviction or sentence imposed. This is similar to the first prong of
the Strickland test, counsel’s deficient performance.146 To show
deficient performance of counsel, a petitioner must show that
“counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”147
Similarly, the petitioner in his prima facie case would have to show
that the scientific evidence in his trial was material to his case and
that its faultiness deprived him of his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to due process of law.
The “materiality” standard would be borrowed from Brady v.
Maryland.148 In that case, the Supreme Court required that for every
accusation that the State withheld discovery, the petitioner must show
that the evidence that was withheld was “material either to [the] guilt
or to [the] punishment” of the petitioner.149 This threshold showing
of materiality would work in the instant situation: the petitioner
would have to show that the introduction of this shoddy science was
144.
145.

146.
147.
148.

149.

See supra Section II.A.
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that to determine whether a petitioner wins a
challenge to the constitutionality of his attorney’s performance, the petitioner must
first show that his counsel acted in a constitutionally deficient manner, and second,
that this deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of his trial).
Id.
Id.
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.”).
See id.
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material either to his guilt or to his punishment, just as Brady
requires.150
Finally, the fourth showing would be akin to Strickland’s prejudice
prong.151 Strickland requires that the deficient performance be so
serious “as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is unreliable.”152 In the instant situation, the petitioner also would
have the burden of showing that this material scientific evidence was
so seriously wrong that it deprived the petitioner of a fair trial,
rendering the result unreliable.153
The petitioner would then have to make a prima facie case of the
four elements in order to be granted a hearing.154 If the petitioner
failed to meet any of these four elements, then his petition would be
summarily denied.155 The rationale behind this screening process is
to allow the board to review only serious claims and to weed out the
frivolous ones, to preserve the finality of criminal opinions, and to
reserve collateral review for only the most serious of cases.156
Therefore, this preliminary screening function would allow for only
the strongest of cases to enter the hearing phase.
2.

The Board’s Evaluation Standard

The petitioner’s hearing before the board would resemble that of a
Daubert hearing and would borrow many of the portions of this
pretrial proceeding. As stated previously, in a Daubert hearing, the
judge is the gatekeeper who decides what evidence may be admitted
based on a variety of factors.157 Similar to the judge’s role in a
Daubert hearing, the board would have a majority vote to determine
the outcome of the validity of the evidence.
As discussed previously, in a Daubert hearing, it is incumbent upon
the proponent of the expert witness to show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, first that the expert is qualified to testify as an expert,
and second, that the witness’s opinions are both relevant and
reliable.158 In the proposed hearing, the board would require the
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

157.
158.

See id.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Id.
See id.
See supra notes 139–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 139–53 and accompanying text.
See ERIC J. MAGNUSON & DAVID F. HERR, FEDERAL APPEALS JURISDICTION AND
PRACTICE § 7:5, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016) (noting that there is a
“strong interest of both the parties and society as a whole in speedy resolution of
criminal cases”).
See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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petitioner to bear this burden.159 Once the burden is met, the expert
may testify as to the validity of the science currently supporting the
petitioner’s conviction or sentence.
This proposed hearing, like Daubert, would be adversarial in
nature.160 The defense would be permitted to present expert
testimony related to the validity of the science, and the State could
recall an expert or find a new one to support its position; this
structure would prevent the defense from any attempt to buy out an
expert witness, and would create a two-sided picture for the proposed
body to consider.161
3.

The Remedy

If the petitioner is successful in the pleading and hearing, the
remedy would be within the board’s discretion to impose. The
options from which the board could choose would be the same
remedies available upon a successful petition pursuant to Section
2255, which include immediate release, a new trial, a vacated
sentence, a set aside sentence, or a corrected sentence.162
If the petitioner is unsuccessful, the case would return to the
judiciary to address any residual due process concerns, just as it
would in the parole system.163 Like probation or parole revocation,
the proposed conviction review is not a stage of a “criminal
prosecution.”164 However, because a petitioner may be similarly
subject to a loss of liberty as a result of this proposal, a denial of due
process should be grounds for judicial review.165
V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Randall Adams sat in prison unable to find a remedy for his
unconstitutional conviction.166 He was fortunate to have received
interest in his case and an excellent pro bono team to help find him a
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See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See Jeffrey S. Parker, Daubert’s Debut: The Supreme Court, the Economics of
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See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82, 782 n.4 (1973).
Id. at 782.
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suitable remedy.167 While Texas allowed Adams a procedural
protection to move for a new trial upon grounds independent of Dr.
Death’s testimony, the federal system lacks any procedural protection
for a defendant incarcerated based on suspect science.168 For a
country proud of its devotion to science and technology, our judicial
system should recognize that, as science changes, convictions, too,
may change. A grave constitutional issue has gone without remedy
long enough, and it is time for our judicial system to afford one.
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See supra notes 13–14, 17–18 and accompanying text.
See Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 293–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that
Brady violations and failure of the State to disclose that it knew of perjured witness
testimony warranted a new trial for Adams). After a state court habeas proceeding,
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas made findings of fact and conclusions of law
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